What an Incident Responder Found in His First 90 Days Running Dealer IT
For years my job was showing up on the worst day of someone’s business. At CrowdStrike I worked hundreds of incident response cases: ransomware, business email compromise, insiders, and attackers who had been sitting quietly in a network for months before anyone noticed. That work gives you a very specific education. Attackers rarely do anything clever. They find the door someone left open and walk through it.
In late 2025 I came home to run IT for Truck Centers, our family’s Freightliner and Western Star dealer group. Twenty-plus locations across Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri. Service, parts, sales, body shops, the whole operation.
I expected the job to feel different from incident response. I didn’t expect to recognize so much of it.
Dealerships are built for uptime, not security
A dealership runs on a simple rule: the truck has to get fixed. A tech who can’t log in, a parts counter that can’t look up inventory, a salesperson who can’t pull a deal jacket. Every one of those is money and a customer relationship walking out the door.
So every security control competes with “a truck is waiting.” Multi-factor prompts, password resets, locked-down machines. Each one is a small tax on people who are already busy. When security and uptime collide, uptime wins almost every time, and honestly, it should win more often than security people like to admit. The job is to build controls that don’t make people choose.
The front desk is the perimeter
In incident response you learn that most breaches don’t start with an exploit. They start with a person. A phone call, an email, a text that looks just legitimate enough.
Dealerships are full of people whose job is to be helpful to whoever reaches out. That’s the business. It’s also exactly what an attacker is counting on.
Here’s one that hits close to home. We’ve had customers whose email systems were compromised, and the attackers used those accounts to email our parts team with malicious links and attachments. The messages came from a real, trusted contact at one of our best customers. Same name, same email address, same signature our people had seen a hundred times. Nothing about it looked wrong, because the account itself was legitimate. It just wasn’t the customer typing.
That’s the shift dealers need to understand. Your security now depends partly on your customers’ and vendors’ security. A trusted sender is no longer proof of a trusted message.
The fix isn’t making people suspicious of everyone. It’s giving them one simple habit: verify through a second channel, like calling back on a known number. That habit matters most when money is involved. Any request to change banking details, redirect a payment, rush a wire, or update remittance information gets a phone call to a number you already have on file. Not the number in the email. Every time.
Decades of “it works, don’t touch it”
I replaced someone who had run IT for 40 years. That kind of tenure builds an environment that is remarkably reliable. It also builds an environment where a lot of knowledge lives in one person’s head.
None of what I found was negligence. It was what happens when the priority for decades is keeping the doors open with a small team. Old systems stay because they work. Shared accounts stay because changing them would break something on a Saturday. Exceptions pile up because each one made sense at the time.
My advice to anyone stepping into a role like this: spend the first months listening before you change anything. Every strange setup has a reason. Some reasons are still good. Find out which ones before you start pulling threads.
Vendors hold more keys than you think
Ask a dealer principal how many outside companies can remotely access their network. Most will guess a handful. The real number is usually much higher: the DMS provider, an MSP, the phone vendor, the camera installer, the copier company, a software vendor someone set up years ago.
Each one is a door. In my IR years, third-party access showed up in a meaningful share of the cases I worked. Attackers love a vendor connection because it’s trusted, often lightly monitored, and rarely reviewed.
One of the first things we did was disable every vendor account. Now when a vendor needs access, they tell us when and why, and we turn it on for that job. No standing access, no unfettered access. Vendors adjusted quickly, and we went from guessing who could get in to knowing.
Shrink what you expose to the internet
Attackers used to have to find you. Now AI-assisted tools scan the entire internet constantly, looking for exposed logins, remote access portals, forgotten servers, and anything running out-of-date software. They find it in hours, not months, and they automate the attack that follows.
Every system you put on the internet is something those tools will find and test. The less you expose, the less there is to attack. If something doesn’t need to be reachable from the outside, it shouldn’t be. If it does, put it behind strong authentication and keep it patched.
The honest truth is that it’s not a matter of if you’ll face a serious attack, but when. You can’t control that. You can control how much of your business is sitting out there waiting to be found, and how ready you are when the day comes.
What I’d tell any dealer principal to do first
You don’t need a Fortune 500 budget to close most of these gaps. Start here:
- Know who has admin access and who can get in remotely, including vendors. Turn vendor access off by default and on only when there’s a reason.
- Give front-line staff one verification habit for phone and email requests, especially anything involving money. Make sure their managers back them when they use it.
- Find out what you have exposed to the internet and take down anything that doesn’t need to be there.
- Decide what you’d do in the first hour of an incident before you need to. Who gets called, who can shut things off, how you’d keep the doors open while you figure it out.
None of this is glamorous. All of it would have changed the outcome in a lot of cases I worked.
The real lesson
The biggest thing I’ve learned in my first months back is that dealer IT isn’t a cost center in the back room. It’s part of running the dealership. The groups that treat it that way will be the ones still standing when the next wave of attacks, or the next wave of AI tools, hits our industry.
I’ll be writing here monthly about what’s actually working for us. If you run a dealer group and something here sounds familiar, I’d like to hear about it.